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Divided Nations: 
The Paradox of National Responsibility
Francis M. Deng
I. Introduction
In assessing the achievements of the United Nations since its cre-
ation, it is worth recalling not only the objectives for which it was 
established, but also how the pursuit of these objectives has broadened 
and deepened over the sixty years of the organization’s existence to 
cover areas that were initially only perceived in visionary terms. The 
United Nations was established in the aftermath of World War II with 
lofty goals: to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, 
“which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind”; 
to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and 
worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and 
nations large and small; to establish conditions under which justice 
and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources 
of international law can be maintained; and to promote social progress 
and better standards of life in larger freedom. Toward those ends, the 
founding nations undertook to practice tolerance and live together in 
peace as good neighbors; to unite “our strength” to maintain interna-
tional peace and security; to ensure by the acceptance of principles and 
the institution of methods that armed force shall not be used, save in 
the common interest; and to employ the international machinery for 
the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples.1
While it is fair to say that the United Nations has been reasonably 
successful in achieving the goals for which it was created, it is also 
important to recognize that this success has been incremental. The 
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United Nations has, of course, succeeded in preventing World War III, 
and lesser conflicts have been significantly reduced. Initially, however, 
war was seen largely as an inter-state phenomenon and did not cover 
internal conflicts, except insofar as they affected other states, which 
sometimes occurred by proxy during the Cold War. Much progress 
has also been made in the area of human rights and international 
humanitarian and development cooperation. Through the U.N., the 
right of self-determination brought independence from colonial domi-
nation to many countries, especially in Africa and Asia. Apartheid in 
South Africa was eliminated through U.N.-led international pressure. 
Within the normative framework created by the U.N., the Declaration 
of Human Rights, the International Bill of Rights, and various treaties 
have been adopted. While these are positive developments in pursuit 
of the global consensus behind the overriding goal of human dignity, 
it should also be borne in mind that until the end of the Cold War, the 
protection of human rights was very much constrained by a narrow 
interpretation of national sovereignty as a barricade against interna-
tional involvement.
An area in which the United Nations has made incremental prog-
ress in recent years is the plight of those forcefully displaced within 
their national borders, defined as “persons or groups of persons who 
have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of 
habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the 
effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations 
of human rights or natural or man-made disasters, and who have not 
crossed an internationally recognized state border.”2
This essay addresses the crisis of internal displacement and the 
response of the United Nations to it, building primarily on the work 
carried out under my mandate as the Representative of the Secretary-
General on Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) from 1992 to 2004. 
The article first presents an overview of the problem and the chal-
lenge it poses for the international community. It will then discuss the 
response of the United Nations that led to the creation of the mandate 
and my appointment as Representative of the Secretary-General. This 
will be followed by a discussion of the activities carried out under the 
mandate. The next section will describe the approach I adopted by 
stipulating sovereignty positively as a concept of state responsibility 
for its citizens, if need be with the cooperation of the international 
community. A case is then made for addressing the root causes of inter-
nal displacement. The section focusing on Africa considers the action 
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the African Union (AU) might take to adapt the work of the United 
Nations in this area to the specific needs of the continent. The essay 
ends with a restatement of the challenge internal displacement poses, 
the action taken by the international community to this challenge, and 
how the AU might build on the work of the U.N. in addressing the cri-
sis on the continent.
II. Overview of the Crisis
Some 25 million persons in over fifty countries are uprooted and forced 
to flee from their homes or areas of habitual residence (but remain 
within their national borders) as a result of internal conflicts, commu-
nal violence, or egregious violations of human rights. As a consequence 
of their forced displacement, they are deprived of such essentials of life 
as shelter, food, medicine, education, community, and a resource base 
for a self-sustaining livelihood. Worse, internally displaced persons 
remain within the borders of a country at war with itself, and when 
they move to safer areas are often viewed as strangers, discriminated 
against, or harassed. Although entire communities are often affected, 
those persons who are uprooted from their homes have been shown to 
be especially vulnerable to physical attack, sexual assault, abduction, 
disease, and deprivation of basic life necessities. They have also been 
documented to suffer higher rates of mortality than the general popu-
lation, sometimes as much as fifty times greater.3
While the crisis is global, some regions of the world are more 
affected than others. By far the worst hit is Africa, with over half of 
the world’s internally displaced population. Sudan is the most affected 
country in the world, with 4.5 million displaced by the war in the 
south and nearly two million in Darfur. By 2004, an estimated 1.4 mil-
lion people had been displaced by conflict in Uganda, and at least 1.5 
million in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).4 Countries that 
have also been much affected in Africa include Angola, Liberia, Sierra 
Leone, and Somalia (where the crisis is compounded by state collapse). 
The problem on the continent, however, is far more pervasive than 
these examples indicate.
Although the concept of state responsibility to guarantee the protec-
tion and general welfare of citizens and all those under state jurisdic-
tion is becoming increasingly accepted in international law, it poses 
practical problems in countries where groups differentiate themselves 
on the basis of race, ethnicity, religion, language, or culture. Often, the 
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most affected are minorities or marginalized groups. In most cases, ele-
ments of these marginalized groups are in conflict with the dominant 
group. Either because they support rebels or dissidents, or are victims 
by mere association, marginal groups tend to be identified as part of 
the enemy. Far from being protected and assisted as citizens, they tend 
to be neglected and even persecuted. Under these circumstances, the 
value of citizenship is only “on paper,” without the enjoyment of the 
rights normally associated with the dignity of being a citizen. As I have 
argued elsewhere, marginalization becomes tantamount to stateless-
ness.5
Findings from my country missions around the world in my capac-
ity as Representative of the Secretary-General underscore the degree 
to which the expectation of internal protection by states is for the most 
part a myth. During these missions, I would meet and dialogue with 
the authorities, visit the internally displaced for an on-site assessment 
of their conditions and needs, return to brief the authorities on my 
findings, and offer preliminary conclusions and recommendations. 
This typically included asking the displaced persons what messages 
they wanted me to take back to their leaders. In one Latin American 
country, the response I got was: “Those are not our leaders. In fact, 
to them, we are criminals, not citizens, and our only crime is that we 
are poor.” In a Central-Asian country, the response was: “We have no 
leaders there. None of our people is in that government.” In an African 
country, a senior U.N. official explained to the Prime Minister, who 
had complained of inadequate support for refugees in his country, 
that U.N. capacity to assist refugees was constrained by the need to 
assist “your people,” the internally displaced and other war-affected 
communities. The Prime Minister’s response was, “Those are not my 
people. In fact, the food you give those people is killing my soldiers.” 
These anecdotes highlight the cleavages of identity that often charac-
terize the conflicts that generate internal displacement and the result-
ing vacuums of responsibility in which IDPs fall.
Far too often these populations are not only dispossessed by their 
own governments, but are outside the reach of the international com-
munity because of the negative approach to sovereignty. While inter-
national humanitarian and human rights instruments offer legally 
binding bases for international protection and assistance to needy pop-
ulations within their national borders, those people are for the most 
part at the mercy of their national authorities for their security and 
general welfare. International access to the internally displaced can 
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be constrained and even blocked by states in the name of sovereignty. 
Diplomacy and the art of persuasion can help to tear down the barri-
ers, but, in extreme circumstances, more assertive intervention may be 
imperative.
III. Genesis of International Response
The plight of the internally displaced emerged into international con-
sciousness in the late 1980s and the early 1990s for reasons connected 
to the end of the Cold War. Foremost among these reasons was the 
steady rise in the number of internally displaced persons associated 
with the increase in internal conflicts. When first counted in 1982, it 
was estimated that there were 1.2 million internally displaced persons. 
By 1992, the number had increased to 24 million.6 Concomitantly, as 
superpower rivalry came to an end, Western governments’ geopoliti-
cal advantage in accepting refugees was diminished and their will-
ingness to do so began to wane. This led to a desire to find a way to 
protect and assist displaced persons in their own countries so as to dis-
courage them from seeking asylum abroad.7 The end of the Cold War 
also marked a shift in the international attitude toward intervention in 
domestic affairs, particularly where states caused, or failed to react to, 
massive humanitarian crises within their own borders.8
During the Cold War, most domestic and regional conflicts were, in 
one way or another, perceived as part of the proxy confrontation of the 
superpowers. Similarly, internal or regional crises and their humani-
tarian consequences used to be managed through the bipolar con-
trol mechanisms of the superpowers, who offered effective support to 
their less capable ideological allies. The outcome of this was that such 
domestic crises as internal displacement were not visible to the outside 
world.
With the end of the Cold War and the withdrawal of the strategic 
interests of the superpowers, these conflicts began to be seen in their 
proper national or regional contexts. The support of the major pow-
ers also disappeared, leaving former allies with significantly reduced 
capacity for suppressing or managing conflicts or responding to their 
humanitarian consequences. Consequently, the post-Cold War era wit-
nessed the proliferation of internal conflicts, which have tended to 
target civilians, including women, children, and the elderly. Without 
external support, both in the management of conflicts and in address-
Macalester International  Vol. 19
84
ing their humanitarian consequences, governments were confronted 
with mounting crises they could hardly manage.
Human rights and humanitarian concerns began to replace stra-
tegic national interest as the driving norms in international politics. 
By the same token, human rights, humanitarian, and development 
organizations began to intensify their activities as the watchdogs of 
the degree to which universal standards were being adhered to or vio-
lated within national borders. To reinforce their capacities for the new 
responsibilities, NGOs began to receive increased support from the 
donor community, which saw them as more transparent and credible 
than governments in meeting the humanitarian needs of the affected 
populations. Under the pressure of these new developments, the rigid 
observance of sovereignty as a barricade against international scrutiny 
began to fall. In the name of human rights and humanitarian concerns, 
the media spotlight began to focus attention on the human tragedies 
within state borders. The narrow view of sovereignty became increas-
ingly challenged as the media and non-governmental organizations 
exposed the plight of millions who fell victim to the new types of wars 
that were fought internally, with devastating loss of lives, egregious 
violations of human rights, and dehumanization of the civilian popu-
lations.
As a result of these factors, the late 1980s saw the stirrings of an 
international response to internal displacement. The issue of the rein-
tegration of internally displaced persons figured prominently in two 
major international conferences at the end of the decade: the 1988 Con-
ference on the Plight of Refugees, Returnees, and Displaced Persons 
in Southern Africa, and the 1989 International Conference on Cen-
tral American Refugees.9 Likewise, in 1989, the UN General Assembly 
called upon the Secretary-General to consider mechanisms for coordi-
nation of relief programs for internally displaced persons.10 In 1990, the 
UN Economic and Social Council requested that the Secretary-General 
initiate a system-wide review of UN entities, with regard to relief and 
the protection of refugees and the internally displaced.11
Importantly, however, “the major impetus behind international rec-
ognition of the problem of internal displacement lay with a group 
of NGOs, mobilized as a result of problems encountered in gaining 
access in the field to large numbers of ‘internal refugees’ who were in 
need of assistance and protection.”12 They set in motion a process that 
eventually resulted in the United Nations becoming actively seized 
with the issue of internal displacement.13 After considering and reject-
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ing various avenues within the U.N., they decided to approach the 
Commission on Human Rights as the forum most accessible for NGOs. 
The issue was then raised at a meeting of diplomats and NGOs during 
the 1991 session of the Commission and won the support of Austria, 
which introduced a draft resolution on internally displaced persons 
based on that statement.14
The resolution called upon the Secretary-General to prepare “an 
analytic report on internally displaced persons.”15 The resulting report 
of the Secretary-General concluded that there was “no clear statement 
of the human rights of internally displaced persons, or those at risk of 
becoming displaced” and recommended the elaboration of guidelines 
which “would consist, at least in part, of clarifying the implications of 
existing human rights law for persons who are internally displaced 
and fashioning from existing standards one comprehensive, univer-
sally applicable body of principles which addressed the main needs 
and problems of such persons.”16
The report further recommended the creation of a “focal point 
within the human rights system” to facilitate the coordination of the 
U.N. response to internal displacement.17 In response to this report, 
Austria introduced a draft resolution to call for a comprehensive 
study “identifying existing laws and mechanisms for the protection 
of internally displaced persons, possible additional new measures to 
strengthen implementation of these laws and mechanisms and alter-
natives for addressing protection needs not adequately covered by 
existing instruments.”18 The establishment of a focal point was also an 
important point of the resolution. As noted in the Secretary-General’s 
report, various parties had recommended mechanisms ranging from 
a working group to a “world court” on the rights of the internally dis-
placed.19 However, many states’ concerns for encroachment upon their 
sovereignty rendered such options unacceptable. The initial draft of 
the resolution asked for the designation of an “independent expert,” 
but in response to India’s preference that the mandate remain with 
the Secretary-General, the final version was changed to call upon the 
Secretary-General to “designate a representative” to seek the views of 
governments, United Nations agencies, regional and non-governmen-
tal organizations, and experts to perform the requested task.20 In July 
1992, the then Secretary-General Boutrous Boutrous-Ghali designated 
me as the representative.
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IV. Stipulating Sovereignty as Responsibility
The fundamental norm of “Sovereignty as Responsibility” that has 
guided my work on internal displacement is, in significant part, the 
result of post-Cold War developments. As the Cold War era was begin-
ning to unravel, it became necessary to speculate on the implications of 
the emerging new order for perceptions of national and regional con-
flicts. It was obvious that these conflicts would no longer be viewed in 
the context of the proxy confrontation between the superpowers. But 
what new conceptual framework would influence response to these 
conflicts in the post-Cold War era? I was involved in two initiatives 
that would help shape my perspective on the emerging challenge. 
One was the development of an African Studies Project of the Foreign 
Policy Studies Program at the Brookings Institution. The other was 
participating in the initiative of the then former Head of State of Nige-
ria and now the twice-elected President, Olusegun Obasanjo, toward 
a Helsinki-like Conference on Security, Stability, Development, and 
Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA).
Our Brookings Africa Project began with a conference that made 
an overall assessment of conflicts in Africa and the challenges of the 
post-Cold War era. The conference papers were edited and published 
by Brookings under the title Conflict Resolution in Africa.21 Following 
the publication of the papers, we undertook national and regional case 
studies to deepen our understanding of the issues involved. Several 
publications resulted from these studies.22 A synthesis of these case 
studies led to the main conclusion: As conflicts become internal, they 
also primarily become the responsibility of governments to prevent, 
manage, and resolve. Governance was perceived primarily as conflict 
management. State sovereignty was then postulated as entailing the 
responsibility of conflict management. Indeed, the concluding volume 
in the African series at Brookings was titled Sovereignty as Responsi-
bility. The envisaged responsibility involved managing diversity; 
ensuring equitable distribution of wealth, services, and development 
opportunities; and participating effectively in regional and interna-
tional arrangements for peace, security, and stability. A subsequent vol-
ume, African Reckoning, tried to put more flesh on the skeleton of the 
responsibilities of sovereignty, building largely on human rights and 
humanitarian norms and international accountability.23 Since internal 
conflicts often spill across international borders, their consequences 
also cross borders, threatening regional security and stability. In the 
Francis M. Deng
87
“apportionment” of responsibilities in the post-Cold War era, regional 
organizations become the second layer of the needed response. And 
yet the international community remains the residual guarantor of 
universal human rights and humanitarian standards in the quest for 
global peace and security.
The development of the Helsinki process for Africa was motivated 
by the concern that the post-Cold War global order was likely to result 
in the withdrawal of the major powers and the marginalization of 
Africa. It was, therefore, imperative for Africa to both take charge of its 
destiny and to observe principles that would appeal to the West and 
thereby provide a sound foundation for a mutually agreeable partner-
ship. This was found in the Helsinki framework of the Economic and 
Security Cooperation in Europe (ESCE), which became the Organiza-
tion for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). A series of meet-
ings culminated in the 1991 Conference in Kampala, Uganda, which 
was attended by some 500 people, including several heads of state 
and representatives from all walks of life. The conference produced 
the Kampala Document, which elaborated upon the four “calabashes,” so 
termed to distinguish them from the OSCE “baskets,” and give them 
an African orientation. The calabashes are security, stability, develop-
ment, and cooperation. The adoption of the CSSDCA by the Organiza-
tion of African Unity was initially blocked by a few governments that 
felt threatened by its normative principles. When Obasanjo returned to 
power as the elected President of Nigeria, he was able to push success-
fully for the incorporation of CSSDCA into the OAU mechanism for 
conflict prevention, management, and resolution.24
In connection with these initiatives, I began to focus attention on 
promoting the need to balance conventional notions of sovereignty 
with the responsibility of the state to provide for the protection and 
general welfare of citizens and all those under state jurisdiction.25 
Given the sensitivity of the mandate on internal displacement, I con-
cluded that the way to bridge between the need for international pro-
tection and assistance for the internally displaced and the barricades of 
the negative approach to sovereignty was to build on the fundamental 
norm of sovereignty as a positive concept of state responsibility toward 
its citizens and those under its jurisdiction. In my own experience, this 
approach has been quite effective in the dialogue with governments. 
On all the missions I undertook to countries around the world, no 
government authority has ever argued, “I don’t care how irresponsible 
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or irresponsive we are, this is an internal matter and none of your busi-
ness.”
The principle of sovereignty as responsibility has been strengthened 
and mainstreamed by the Canadian-sponsored Commission on Inter-
vention and State Sovereignty.26 In a book on the work of my mandate, 
Thomas G. Weiss and David A. Korn traced the development of the 
principle from what they called the “Brookings doctrine” of the Africa 
Project, its application to the IDP mandate, and its endorsement and 
elaboration by the International Committee on Intervention and the 
Responsibility to Protect. The commission’s final report, the authors 
note, “open[s] with words that could have come from Deng’s pen:”
State sovereignty implies responsibility, and the primary responsibil-
ity for the protection of its people lies with the state itself. Where a 
population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insur-
gency, repression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling 
or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-interference yields to the 
international responsibility to protect.27
The authors, one of whom led the Secretariat of the Commission, note 
further that “although the commission never formally acknowledged 
the parentage of the ‘responsibility to protect,’ a paraphrase of sover-
eignty as responsibility…among individual commissioners and staff, 
there are individuals who are aware of the connection.” Furthermore, 
they quote former Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy, who 
was responsible for the establishment of the Commission: “The first 
time I heard the notion of ‘responsibility to protect’ was when Deng 
visited me in Ottawa and argued for a clear commitment by the inter-
national community to deal with the IDP issue.”28 In a paper entitled, 
“Sovereignty as Responsibility,” Amitai Etzioni discusses the work of 
the Brookings Africa Project, which lay the foundation for the approach 
I adopted for my mandate:
Francis Deng and associates at the Brookings Institute published a book 
in 1996 challenging what had been the key principle of international 
relations since the signing of the treaty of Westphalia in 1648: that sov-
ereign states are not to interfere in one another’s internal affairs. Their 
book, Sovereignty as Responsibility: Conflict Management in Africa, argues 
that when nations do not conduct their internal affairs in ways that meet 
internationally recognized standards, other nations not only have the 
right, but also have a duty, to intervene. Deng et al. propose that those 
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governments that do not fulfill their responsibilities to their people for-
feit their sovereignty. In effect, the authors redefine sovereignty as the 
responsibility to protect the people in a given territory.29
Noting that the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty and the Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on Threats, 
Challenges and Change “affirmed Deng et al.’s proposals,” Etzioni 
added, “Deng et al. realized that the sovereignty-as-responsibility 
principle was not observed as a universal doctrine but held that it is 
becoming increasingly recognized as the centerpiece of sovereignty.”30 
In his view, “A concept of sovereignty as responsibility that includes 
both the duty to protect and the duty to prevent has broad appeal 
across the political spectrum. Progressives can support the assertion 
that nations have a duty to intervene in failing or authoritarian states 
on humanitarian grounds, while neoconservatives hold that interven-
tion in such states is necessary to preserve national and international 
security.”31 Etzioni concludes with this appraisal: “The new concep-
tion of sovereignty as responsibility is a telling sign of the new, shared 
moral understandings. In the long run, all this points to the normative 
theses that ultimately the only sovereign that can provide the final 
authorization for acts of coercion is the people of the world, the so-
called international community, not those of one nation or the other or 
even a grouping of such nations.”32
The principle has continued to gain wide support from the inter-
national community. As the U.N. prepared for its 60th-anniversary 
celebration, the Secretary-General pleaded that, “we must embrace 
the responsibility to protect.”33 The World Summit of Heads of State 
and Government, which convened in New York in September 2005, 
“stressed the need for the General Assembly to continue consider-
ation of the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity.”34 Former High 
Commissioner for Refugees, Sadako Ogata, in a foreward to Weiss 
and Korn’s book on the work of my mandate, wrote that the book 
“explores ‘sovereignty as responsibility’ ” which she describes as “the 
most powerful idea that has emerged in the international arena in the 
last decade. Evolving rapidly from a humanitarian issue, the question 
of internally displaced persons (IDPs) came to challenge state sover-
eignty as the founding principle of international relations.”35
The challenge that postulating sovereignty as responsibility poses 
for the international community is that it implies accountability. Obvi-
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ously, the internally displaced themselves—marginalized, excluded, 
often persecuted—have little capacity to hold their national authorities 
accountable. Only the international community, including sub-regional, 
regional, and international organizations, has the leverage and clout to 
persuade governments and other concerned actors to discharge their 
responsibility or otherwise fill the vacuum of irresponsible or unre-
sponsive sovereignty. Often, the fact is that governments of affected 
countries, even if they wanted to discharge the responsibility of assist-
ing and protecting their needy populations, lack the resources and the 
capacity to do so. Offering them support in a way that links humani-
tarian assistance with protection in a holistic, integrated approach to 
human rights should make the case more compelling. No government 
deserving any legitimacy can request material assistance from the out-
side world and reject concern for the human rights of the people on 
whose behalf it requests assistance. Doing so would be like asking the 
international community to feed them without ensuring their safety 
and dignity. Now that the standard has been set, the focus of the inter-
national community should shift to the need for implementation.
V. Activities of the Mandate
Over the years, the role of the mandate crystallized into raising the 
level of awareness about the displacement crisis worldwide and act-
ing as a catalyst for an international response. Specifically, the activi-
ties of the mandate focus on several pillars. They include developing 
an appropriate normative framework for responding to the protec-
tion and assistance needs of the internally displaced; fostering effec-
tive institutional arrangements at the international and regional levels 
to these same ends; focusing attention on specific situations through 
country missions; cooperating with regional and civil society organiza-
tions; and undertaking further research to broaden and deepen under-
standing of the problem in its various dimensions.
A. Developing a Normative Framework
Soon after my appointment, I circulated a questionnaire and engaged 
in extensive consultations with states and other interested parties, 
both within and outside the U.N. framework, eliciting in particular 
the support of legal scholars at Harvard and Yale to assist in identify-
ing existing legal rights. My comprehensive study was presented to 
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the Commission in 1993.36 The study concluded that, with the excep-
tion of some important gaps, existing international law provided wide 
coverage for the protection needs of internally displaced persons.37 
The principal problem lay not only in the lack of implementation, but 
also in the fact that the existing protections were spread out in a wide 
variety of instruments, and not focused on the needs of the internally 
displaced.
The study noted that a new legal instrument specifically addressing 
the needs of internally displaced persons might both bridge the gaps 
in the existing normative framework and encourage greater compli-
ance. However, the urgent need for international guidance required 
the development during a “transitional phase” of an initial, non-bind-
ing set of principles to “focus international attention, raise the level of 
awareness and stimulate practical measures for alleviating the crisis.” 
At that time, a process involving three steps was envisaged for the 
transitional phase: a compilation of existing law, the drafting of “guid-
ing principles” as an informal code of conduct, and finally an authori-
tative legal document, perhaps in the form of a declaration. Given the 
urgency of the need, I suggested that those steps might be pursued 
simultaneously.
In response to the report, the Commission adopted a resolution 
specifically noting my recommendations for the compilation of exist-
ing legal norms and developing guiding principles, “taking note with 
appreciation” of my study generally “and of the useful suggestions 
and recommendations contained therein,” and calling upon the Sec-
retary-General to extend my mandate for two years.38 In partnership 
with Roberta Cohen, I convened a series of meetings in collaboration 
with the American Society of International Law and the Human Rights 
Law Group in Washington (under the auspices of the Brookings Insti-
tution and in collaboration with international legal experts) to assist 
in the compilation of existing law and to develop guiding principles. 
(Roberta Cohen is a human rights expert and activist whom we had 
invited to join the Africa Studies Project at Brookings to assist with the 
IDP work and who became Associate Director and then Co-Director 
of the Brookings Project on Internal Displacement.) Professor Robert 
Goldman of the American University Law School became a critical 
legal partner. The team was soon joined by Manfred Nowak of the 
Boltsman Institute in Vienna, Austria. Goldman and Nowak oversaw 
the work of researchers in their respective institutions toward the com-
pleted standards in human rights law, humanitarian law, and analo-
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gous refugee law pertinent to the needs of the internally displaced. The 
task of bridging the gaps between the differing approaches of the two 
teams was accomplished largely through the genius of Walter Kalin of 
the University of Bern in Switzerland, who chaired the meetings of the 
legal team.
Out of this process emerged what became known as the “Compila-
tion and Analysis,” consisting of two complementary parts or phases. 
The first examined international law applicable to persons who had 
already been displaced, and was presented to the Commission in 
1996.39 The second focused on protections against displacement in the 
first instance and was presented in 1998.40 Both studies concluded, as 
with the 1992 report, that existing law theoretically provided wide 
coverage of the protection needs of the internally displaced, but that 
grey areas and gaps existed, which needed to be remedied. Moreover, 
the existing standards were dispersed in a number of different instru-
ments without specific focus on the internally displaced.
In response to the first part of the Compilation, the Commission 
adopted a resolution in 1996 directing me to “continue, on the basis of 
[the] compilation and analysis of legal norms, to develop an appropri-
ate framework in this regard for the protection of internally displaced 
persons.”41 It should be noted in this respect that there was a subtle 
resistance to the development of a legal instrument. In the informal 
consultations, the term “normative framework” was suggested, but 
some states objected that it implied “legal.” The formulation of an 
“appropriate framework” was therefore considered less controversial. 
Yet everyone knew that what was meant was a legal framework.
While the second part of the study was underway, we began to 
work on an appropriate framework without worrying about how it 
would eventually be labeled or whether it would be a declaration, a 
convention, a code of conduct, or only a set of guidelines. Once again, 
we engaged in extensive consultations, now consistently chaired by 
Walter Kalin, with representatives of various U.N. agencies, NGOs, 
and other interested actors, in particular through a series of consulta-
tive meetings which brought in not only the substantive input of the 
various parties but also encouraged their commitment to the success 
and acceptance of the eventual product.42 Of particular importance 
was reaching out to and addressing the concerns of the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). It had warned about the possibil-
ity that new guidelines might weaken the standing and application of 
existing humanitarian laws. The participation of ICRC in the process 
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became one of the most significant elements in the development of the 
Guiding Principles.43
As we were finalizing the framework in a meeting of the expert 
team, we decided by spontaneous consensus that although (in my 1992 
report to the Commission) I had raised the possibility of seeking a dec-
laration or even a legal instrument, we should instead concentrate on 
presenting the framework as a set of nonbinding principles. In doing 
so, we were guided in part by the concerns of the ICRC about the 
negative potential of reopening the door on already accepted rights, 
thereby undermining them, and also by the desire to avoid the delays 
inherent in state negotiations on such a potentially contentious issue in 
light of the urgent need for action on the ground.44
The resulting Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement restate, 
interpret, and apply standards from human rights, humanitarian, and 
analogous refugee law.45 They are divided into four sections, address-
ing protection against displacement; protection and assistance during 
displacement; access to humanitarian assistance; and return, resettle-
ment, and reintegration. The Guiding Principles apply not only to 
states, but also to “all other authorities, groups and persons in their 
relations with internally displaced persons.”46 This included non-state 
actors, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, and 
internally displaced persons themselves. Underlying the Guiding Prin-
ciples is the fundamental notion that the primary responsibility for 
ensuring the protection and assistance of internally displaced persons 
resides with states as an aspect of their sovereignty. Should they fail to 
discharge their responsibility for lack of capacity or will, the interna-
tional community has the right and the responsibility to intervene.
It is, however, important to underscore the role of non-state actors. 
In conflict situations, rebel movements (in contradistinction to states) 
often control sizeable territories and populations, and engage in egre-
gious violations of human rights. Holding non-state actors accountable 
means engaging them in a constructive dialogue, which should not be 
construed as recognition or conferring legitimacy. Governments must 
accept such engagement if they are to hold non-state actors responsible 
for human rights violations.
The draft principles were finalized at an expert consultation, hosted 
by the Government in Vienna in January 1998, and attended by repre-
sentatives of the U.N. agencies, non-governmental organizations, and 
regional organizations. Following the consultation, we held a strategic 
meeting with our core team on how to approach the Commission. The 
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plan agreed upon was that we should not aim for formal adoption by 
the Commission, which was bound to be controversial, but should 
instead have the Principles acknowledged. The Austrian draft resolu-
tion for the Commission did just that.
Soon after they were finalized and before they were presented to the 
Commission, I shared the Guiding Principles with the Inter-Agency 
Standing Committee (IASC), a forum created in 1991 to enhance coor-
dination among the agencies. Under the chairmanship of the then 
Under Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, Sergio Vieira de 
Mello, the IASC adopted a decision at its March 1998 meeting. It wel-
comed the Guiding Principles and encouraged its members to share 
them with their executive boards and staff, especially those in the field, 
and to apply them in their activities on behalf of internally displaced 
persons.
The momentum of the IASC decision provided important support 
for the reception of the Guiding Principles at the Commission several 
weeks later. Despite years of resolutions encouraging me to proceed 
with the development of an “appropriate” framework, consultations 
by the Austrians about the relevant draft resolution “taking note” of 
the Principles indicated that a number of states were still fearful about 
potential encroachment on their national sovereignty. In the end, how-
ever, only the representative of Mexico expressed reservations about 
the manner in which the Principles had been developed, but even he 
voted for the resolution. Essentially, the resolution took note of the 
Guiding Principles and my intention to use them in dialogues with 
governments and inter-governmental and non-governmental organiza-
tions, as well as the prior decision of the IASC to make use of them.47
Since their presentation to the Commission on Human Rights in 
1998, the Guiding Principles have been acknowledged widely by U.N. 
bodies. The U.N. Secretary-General has cited them as a major achieve-
ment in the humanitarian area.48 He recommended to the Security 
Council that in cases of massive displacement, it should encourage 
states to be guided by the Principles.49 The Council has indeed begun 
to refer to them in regard to specific situations.50 The General Assem-
bly and the Commission on Human Rights requested that I make use 
of the Principles in my dialogues with governments, inter-governmen-
tal organizations, and NGOs.51
The Brookings Project on Internal Displacement, together with the 
U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and 
the IASC, has produced two additional publications on the Guiding 
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Principles, Handbook for Applying the Guiding Principles and Manual on 
Field Practice in Internal Displacement.52 These documents spell out the 
Guiding Principles in more understandable language and explain their 
practical application in the field. Furthermore, the Brookings Project, 
in collaboration with the American Society of International Law, has 
produced Professor Walter Kalin’s Annotations on the Guiding Prin-
ciples, which explain their sources in human rights law, humanitarian 
law, and analogous refugee law.53
The General Assembly and the Commission encouraged the wide 
dissemination and application of the Principles by international, 
regional, and non-governmental organizations. Several regional orga-
nizations, among them the Organization of African Unity (now the 
African Union), the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights of 
the Organization of American States, and the Organization for Security 
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), have indeed begun to dissemi-
nate the Principles, to use them as a basis for measuring conditions 
on the ground, and to sponsor workshops featuring them. In October 
1998, the OAU co-sponsored with the U.N. High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) and the Brookings Project a workshop on Internal 
Displacement in Africa. Subsequent workshops were held in Bogotá, 
Colombia, in May 1999; Bangkok, Thailand, in February 2000; Tbilisi, 
Georgia, in May 2000 (in cooperation with the OSCE); Jakarta, Indone-
sia, in June 2001; Yerevan, Armenia, in October 2001; Tbilisi, Georgia, 
in February 2002; and Baku, Azerbaijan, in February 2002. A number of 
additional country and sub-regional workshops have since followed. 
In addition, NGOs, such as the Norwegian Refugee Council, have held 
training workshops on the Guiding Principles in Burundi, Colombia, 
India, Liberia, and Sierra Leone. Following the workshops, projects 
are undertaken to help strengthen local capacities, with the support of 
partner organizations.
To assist in the promotion, dissemination, and application of the 
Guiding Principles at the national level, and indicative of their increas-
ing use and relevance in different parts of the world, the Principles 
continue to be translated into a multitude of languages. Initially made 
available in all the official languages of the U.N. (Arabic, Chinese, Eng-
lish, French, Russian, and Spanish) for their submission to the Com-
mission in 1998, the Principles have since been translated into many 
local languages relevant to particular situations of internal displace-
ment (Abkhaz, Albanian, Armenian, Assamese, Azeri, Bahasa Indone-
sia, Bengali, Burmese, Cebuano, Chin, Dari, Dinka, Georgian, Hausa, 
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Kirundi, Kurdish, Luo, Macedonian, Maguindanaon, Mandarin, 
Nepali, Nuer, Pashtu, Portuguese, Rutoro, Serbo-Croatian, Serbo-Croa-
tian Cyrillic, Sgaw Karen, Sinhala, Somali, Swahili, Tagalog, Tamil, 
Tetum, Thai, Turkish, Urdu, and Yoruba). Efforts to translate and pub-
lish the Principles have been undertaken at the initiative of a variety of 
actors—the U.N. and its agencies, international and local NGOs, and 
governments, often working in partnership.
At a colloquy on the Guiding Principles convened in collaboration 
with the government of Austria in Vienna, September 2000, national 
NGOs throughout the world reported on their use of the Principles 
in their dialogue with local and national authorities.54 Regional inter-
governmental organizations also cited the Principles as an effective 
protection tool; and in Asia, national human rights commissions 
acknowledged the utility of the Guiding Principles, both in their moni-
toring activities and in advising government officials and legislators on 
the content of draft legislation. Furthermore, the Principles have been 
cited by U.N. treaty bodies in their interpretation of the law relevant to 
internally displaced populations.
Governments also have found the Guiding Principles a useful 
guide for the development of laws on internal displacement and as a 
yardstick for measuring conditions in their countries. In Angola, for 
example, the Principles form the basis of the Norms on the Resettle-
ment of the Internally Displaced, and in Burundi they have been used 
as the foundation of a permanent framework for the protection of 
internally displaced persons. In Colombia, a Presidential Directive of 
November 2001 recalls two decisions of the Constitutional Court citing 
the Guiding Principles, and elaborating the responsibilities of govern-
ment authorities for protecting and assisting the internally displaced. 
The government of Georgia informed the U.N. that it is committed, 
through a special parliamentary commission, to bringing its electoral 
laws in line with the Guiding Principles. The Ugandan government 
also developed a national policy for IDPs and an implementation plan, 
both of which draw heavily on the Guiding Principles on Internal Dis-
placement. In the Sudan, even before the Comprehensive Peace Agree-
ment (CPA) was concluded, the Government and the Sudan People’s 
Liberation Movement adopted a joint policy on IDPs based on the 
Principles.
It must be said that a small number of governments questioned the 
innovative process by which the Guiding Principles were developed. 
At the July 2000 session of the U.N.’s Economic and Social Council 
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(ECOSOC), these governments expressed the view that principles not 
drafted or formally adopted by governments cannot have real stand-
ing. In the Third Committee of the General Assembly of 2000, the same 
group of governments tried to prevent the reference to the Guiding 
Principles in an “omnibus” resolution on the work of the UNHCR, 
despite the fact that such reference had been part of the resolution 
adopted unanimously by the General Assembly for the preceding 
two years. In the end, at the insistence of Egypt, the resolution was 
voted on and adopted by a majority of 118, with none against and 
thirty abstentions. The same governments raised similar concerns dur-
ing the 2001 General Assembly and argued for the submission of the 
Guiding Principles to the General Assembly for formal consideration. 
After intensive and extensive consultations, the resolution on internal 
displacement was adopted by consensus.55 In collaboration with the 
U.N.’s Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC), who is also the Under 
Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and the Head of OCHA, 
we conducted informal consultations with these and other delega-
tions to promote understanding and develop a common ground on the 
Guiding Principles. As a result, a broader consensus has developed in 
support of the Guiding Principles.
Ironically, the governments that expressed reservations had voted 
for the Commission and General Assembly resolutions encouraging 
the development of the Guiding Principles over the years, recommend-
ing their wide dissemination and requesting me to use them as the 
basis for dialogue with governments. The outcome of the vote itself 
testifies to the increasing recognition the Guiding Principles are receiv-
ing, which in turn reaffirms that they indeed fill a normative vacuum.
Now that the normative ground has been well established by the 
Guiding Principles, it is time to shift attention toward implementation 
to provide protection and assistance to the internally displaced. As 
part of the focus of implementation, it is important to effectively mobi-
lize non-governmental organizations and civil society generally as the 
watchdogs of protection and assistance for IDPs and other war affected 
populations.
B. Developing Institutional Arrangements
As was the case with the legal framework, the gaps in the international 
system relating to the internally displaced were obvious. Again, in con-
trast with refugees, for whom the UNHCR has responsibility for their 
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protection and assistance, there is no one specialized agency for the 
internally displaced. In my first report to the Commission, I suggested 
a number of institutional options: the creation of a specialized agency 
for the internally displaced; the designation of an existing agency to 
assume full responsibility for them; and a collaborative arrangement 
that would utilize existing capacities and enhance the effectiveness of 
the international system.
It soon became clear that there was no political will in the interna-
tional community to create a new agency for the internally displaced. 
Designating a single agency to assume full responsibility for them is an 
idea that resurfaces periodically, as it did again in January 2000, when 
U.S. Ambassador Richard Holbrooke made that proposal while serv-
ing as President of the Security Council. However, a broad consensus 
emerged that the problem is too big for one agency and requires the 
collaborative capacities of the international system.
Nevertheless, there is a need to strengthen the collaborative approach 
to overcome the challenging problems of coordination and response 
gaps that frequently arise under the present arrangement, especially 
in the realm of protection. The 1997 Secretary-General’s reform pro-
gram drew special attention to the gaps in the international system in 
responding to the protection and assistance needs of the internally dis-
placed and gave the Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) the respon-
sibility for ensuring that these needs are addressed adequately within 
the U.N.’s interagency framework.56
In an effort to focus greater attention on the protection of internally 
displaced persons, I consulted the ERC and the U.N. High Commis-
sioner for Human Rights about what exactly was meant by protection 
and whose responsibility it was to provide it. We agreed that it would 
be useful to draft a joint policy paper on what precisely protection 
meant and how it might be ensured by the international system. The 
resulting paper, adopted by the IASC in December 1999, notes the need 
to give practical effect to the responsibilities of international agencies 
in regard to protection as a principle of security, physical integrity, 
and respect for human rights. The paper sets out a number of strategic 
areas of activity through which the international community can fulfill 
those responsibilities. These include: promotion and dissemination of 
the Guiding Principles; active and assertive advocacy for the rights of 
the internally displaced; strengthening local and national protection 
capacities; promoting protection in the design of assistance programs, 
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including those regarding return or resettlement and reintegration; 
and operational monitoring and reporting.57
The IASC also adopted supplementary guidance to U.N. resident 
and humanitarian coordinators to facilitate their protection and assis-
tance responsibilities. The resident and humanitarian coordinators are 
responsible for coordinating the U.N. response to both the protection 
and assistance needs of the internally displaced in a given country, and 
for ensuring that response gaps are addressed systematically.58 The 
IASC subsequently appointed a Special Coordinator to lead an Inter-
Agency Network to examine situations of internal displacement with a 
view to ensuring both an effective response to the protection and assis-
tance needs and an appropriate coordination mechanism.
In April 2001, the Special Coordinator issued a report on the activi-
ties and findings of the Network. The report found that the U.N., inter-
national organizations, and non-governmental organizations all need 
to increase their focus on, and support to, internally displaced persons. 
To ensure increased focus, the Special Coordinator recommended the 
establishment of a non-operational internally displaced persons unit 
within OCHA. Based on that recommendation, the Emergency Relief 
Coordinator proposed to the Secretary-General the establishment of 
such a unit. The proposal was endorsed by the Secretary-General, and 
the unit became operational as of January 2002. Following a critical 
evaluation of its work two years later, the unit was transformed into 
a Division at OCHA in 2004, headed by a senior person with a back-
ground in protection at UNHCR. More recently, the idea of a lead 
agency appears to have gained ground, with UNHCR as the preferred 
agency for the task.
C. Country Missions
Country missions were the most tangible means for assessing both 
the conditions on the ground and the effectiveness of the national and 
international response to specific situations. In addition to country 
conferences, workshops, and related activities in a number of coun-
tries, I undertook twenty-eight official country missions.59 These mis-
sions offered the opportunity for dialogue with governments and other 
concerned actors on ways to improve the conditions of the internally 
displaced by bridging the gap between principles of protection and 
assistance and the actual conditions of the displaced on the ground. 
They also helped advance understanding of the generic problems of 
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internal displacement and the responses needed to alleviate the dire 
conditions to which the displaced often were subjected.
Country missions, ironically, also raised the stakes involved in the 
needed response. Merely undertaking a mission conveyed to the dis-
placed populations that the international community cared about their 
plight. Although one should not promise too much in meetings with 
them, it was inevitable that it gave them hope for international coop-
eration with their government to address their needs. Yet, unless these 
missions in fact resulted in improved responses to their needs, their 
hope could turn to despair and leave them worse off than they were 
before the mission. That was why I pleaded with all concerned, both 
national and international actors, to do what was within their capac-
ity to respond to the needs of the displaced and prove to them that the 
world genuinely cared about their plight.
Out of the twenty-eight missions I undertook, twelve were to Afri-
can countries. In the order in which the missions were undertaken, 
these included: Somalia, visited at the peak of the crisis in 1992; Sudan, 
the country with the largest number of IDPs in the world, first visited 
in 1992, with four subsequent follow-up missions including in 2004 to 
Darfur; Burundi, first in 1994, with a subsequent follow-up mission in 
2001, in response to the polices of forced relocation; Rwanda in 1995 in 
the immediate aftermath of the genocide; Mozambique in 1997 follow-
ing the end of the war and amidst massive returns of IDPs to areas of 
origin; Angola, in 2001, where large populations were still displaced 
because of Jonas Savimbi’s breach of the peace accord; and Uganda, 
2004, where the Acholi people of the northern region were devastated 
by the activities of the Lords Resistance Army (LRA).
Closely connected with country missions are national and regional 
workshops on internal displacement, which always offer opportuni-
ties for discussions with the authorities. Out of the seventeen such 
workshops and seminars conducted around the world, five were in 
Africa: Workshop on Internal Displacement in October 1998, in Addis 
Ababa, Ethiopia, cosponsored by The Brookings Institution, UNHCR, 
and the Organization of African Unity; Workshop on International 
Migration in West Africa, in October 2002, in Senegal, co-sponsored by 
the Economic Community of West African Countries (ECOWAS)) with 
the assistance of participation of the Brookings-SAIS project; Seminar 
on Internal Displacement, in November 2002, in Rumbek, southern 
Sudan, cosponsored by Brookings-SAIS Project on Internal Displace-
ment and UNICEF; Conference on Internal Displacement, held in 
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August–September, 2003, in Khartoum, Sudan in the IGAD sub-region, 
cosponsored by the Brookings-SAIS Project and the UN Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, IDP Unit, in collaboration with 
the Inter-governmental Authority for Development (IGAD) and hosted 
by the Government of the Sudan; and Seminar on Internal Displace-
ment in the South African Development Community (SADC) Region, 
held in August 2005, in Gaborone, Botswana, cosponsored by the 
Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement, Representative of 
the UN Secretary-General on the Human Rights of IDPs (Walter Kalin), 
UNHCR, and hosted by the Government of Botswana.
D. Levels of International Cooperation
An important aspect of our work is the linkage of various levels of 
international cooperation and action. When we remember that the 
problem is inherently internal, then the distance between global con-
cerns and local conditions becomes obvious. Working through regional 
organizations and local communities down to the ground level is cru-
cial. The Internal Displacement Project not only conducts and commis-
sions research on various aspects of the problem, but also organizes 
seminars at the national and regional levels, and cooperates with com-
munity leaders, research institutions, academicians, and other experts 
around the world. In addition, the Project has assisted the work of the 
IDP mandate in forging cooperation with regional organizations.
The need for regional cooperation emanates from the fact that these 
problems usually spill over the borders. Therefore, the problems of 
one country become shared by the region. By the same token, there 
is a mutual interest on the part of governments to work together in 
addressing their problems cooperatively. Over the years and as noted 
earlier with respect to the promotion of the Guiding Principles, the 
Project has forged relationships with regional organizations around 
the world, including the Commonwealth, the Council of Europe (COE), 
the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Inter-
Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the Organization 
of African Unity (OAU, now the African Union (AU)), the Organiza-
tion of American States (OAS), and the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).
We have also found that it is important to see IDPs not just as victims 
of humanitarian crises, but as citizens with rights, who are capable of 
resourcefully responding to their situation. With the development of 
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the Guiding Principles and institutional arrangements, there is a need 
to empower the IDPs to themselves appreciate their rights and demand 
protection and assistance from their governments and to appeal to the 
outside world to step in when their own governments fail to provide 
them. The Guiding Principles are proving to be significant in turning 
what would be an expectation of welfare to demands of rights by IDPs. 
Ensuring that IDPs can access and use the Guiding Principles is one of 
the reasons why they have been translated into many languages.
E. A Research Agenda
Finally, as part of the mandate, we conducted studies on internal dis-
placement. Apart from my first book, Protecting the Dispossessed: A 
Challenge to the International Community, which was a revised version of 
my first report to the Commission on Human Rights, the most signifi-
cant of these studies was the comprehensive study, composed of two 
volumes, Masses in Flight: The Global Crisis of Internal Displacement and 
The Forsaken People: Case Studies of the Internally Displaced, co-authored 
and co-edited, respectively, with Roberta Cohen and published by the 
Brookings Institution in 1998.60 An illustrated abridged version of these 
two volumes, entitled Exodus Within Borders: An Introduction to the Cri-
sis of Internal Displacement, was also published by Brookings in 1999. 
The objective of the study was to probe such issues as the numbers 
and distribution of internally displaced persons globally, their needs, 
how these needs were being met, what gaps existed in meeting those 
needs, and how these gaps could be bridged by the international com-
munity, including regional organizations and NGOs. In particular, the 
study identifies the tremendous gap in the area of protection and made 
a series of recommendations for increasing attention to the physical 
security and human rights of displaced populations. It was our hope 
that the study would contribute to a more in-depth understanding of 
the global crisis of internal displacement, and of the steps needed to 
address it. Indeed, the response we received indicated that the study 
has achieved much of our intended objective. In addition, the project 
has produced numerous publications over the years on various aspects 
of the displacement crisis worldwide.
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VI. Addressing the Root Causes
In my statements on the crisis of internal displacement, including dur-
ing my country missions, and in my reports to various organs of the 
U.N. system, I always ended by seeing the crisis as offering opportuni-
ties to address the root causes of internal displacement. Displacement is 
only a symptom of the causes reflected mostly in conflicts and human 
rights violations, which are themselves symptoms of deeper rooted 
problems, embodied in diversities characterized by acute disparities 
or inequalities in the shaping and sharing of power, national wealth, 
public services, and development opportunities. As noted earlier, dis-
crimination on the basis of race, ethnicity, religion, culture, or gender 
means that there are those who are “in,” enjoying the dignity of full 
citizenship, and those who are “out,” marginalized to the point of vir-
tual statelessness. Unless these inequities are affirmatively addressed, 
these countries will have a hard time achieving peace, security, stabil-
ity, and development.
Ironically, while conflicts, displacement, and the resulting viola-
tions of human rights and humanitarian standards are rooted in gross 
inequities, displacement itself exposes the disadvantaged to conditions 
in the more privileged areas, which sharpen even more the citizens’ 
realization of their marginalization. Even if peace is achieved and the 
displaced are able to return to their areas of origin, they cannot be 
expected to go back to the prior conditions of dire poverty and lack 
of essential services, employment opportunities, and prospects for 
economic, social, and cultural development. Not only should they be 
guaranteed safe return, they also need to be provided with assistance 
for their general welfare and sustainable development.
It is necessary to see both the problem and the response holistically. 
Internal displacement challenges the international community with 
the need to develop ways of preventing the arbitrary displacement 
of populations, responding to the protection and assistance needs of 
those already displaced, and finding durable solutions in the form 
of safe return with dignity, alternative resettlement, and social rein-
tegration and development. Beyond that, it requires addressing the 
root causes in order to create the conditions for a just peace, security, 
stability, and development. This would, in turn, prevent or discour-
age displacement. In other words, internal displacement is not only a 
humanitarian and human rights crisis, it is also a political and security 
issue—a challenge to nation-building.
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Displacement often exposes affected rural populations to the oppor-
tunities enjoyed by citizens in urban centers, which they have hereto-
fore been denied. It can have the effect of increasing their resentment 
and hostility. Unless effectively remedied, this may sow the seeds 
of further conflict in the country. Indeed, the crisis of displacement 
should be seen as a wake-up call and an opportunity for addressing 
the deeper, structural ills of the country to forge a national common 
ground and collective vision for nation building.
This requires creating an environment in which all citizens feel a 
sense of belonging on equal footing—an environment in which their 
human rights and fundamental liberties are respected without dis-
crimination on the grounds of race, national origin, ethnicity, religion, 
culture, gender, or other grounds, and in which the state will respond 
effectively to their needs for protection and humanitarian assistance, 
and in which, in the end, they are guaranteed lasting solutions to 
return to their homes or are resettled and assisted with resuming self-
reliant and integrated development.
VII. Developing an AU Framework
The principles enshrined in the 2000 Constitutive Act of the African 
Union include the protection of internally displaced persons. The Act 
calls for the protection of human and peoples’ rights in accordance 
with the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. The insti-
tutions established consequently (the AU and the African Commis-
sion on Human and Peoples’ Rights) seek to strengthen African states’ 
responses to displacement at the regional and sub-regional levels.61 
Moreover, the Union’s legal framework, which permits intervention in 
cases of war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity, is more 
compatible than that of the OAU in responding to internal conflicts 
and the resulting displacement. In May 2004, the African Commis-
sion appointed a Special Rapporteur on Refugees, Asylum Seekers 
and Internally Displaced Persons in Africa. Mr Bahame Tom Nyan-
duga, the Special Rapporteur, is mandated to investigate situations of 
internal displacement and improve protection mechanisms for inter-
nal displacement in Africa. During the First Regional Conference on 
Internal Displacement in West Africa in April 2006 (co-sponsored by 
the Brookings Institution-University of Bern Project on Internal Dis-
placement, ECOWAS, UNHCR, and my successor, Professor Walter 
Kalin, the Representative of the U.N. Secretary-General on the Human 
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Rights of Internally Displaced Persons), Mr. Nyanduga stated that 
he has focused on supporting the AU’s initiative to establish a legal 
framework on IDPs, and integrating the Guiding Principles into the 
legal systems of African states.62 As explained earlier, work on the 
Guiding Principles was a protracted, incremental process that initially 
involved requesting legal scholars to produce drafts building on the 
three sources: human rights law, humanitarian law, and analogous ref-
ugee law. These drafts were thoroughly discussed by a team of senior 
legal scholars over several sessions, with each session advancing the 
text and raising issues for further research and consideration. The dis-
cussion groups that considered the texts were broadened to include 
representatives of relevant U.N. agencies, regional organizations, and 
NGOs. In these sessions, we tried to ensure African participation in a 
variety of capacities, but obviously, in retrospect, considering that the 
continent is the worst affected, African contributions could and should 
have been stronger. Once the draft was finalized and endorsed by the 
U.N. Inter-Agency Standing Committee (comprising the heads of all 
the U.N. humanitarian, human rights, and development agencies), it 
was submitted to the Commission on Human Rights and later to the 
General Assembly. The response the Guiding Principles have received 
has already been presented above. It should be emphasized that in our 
cooperation with the regional organizations, the OAU was in the lead 
in organizing meetings on the Guiding Principles and called in strong 
language for their dissemination and application.
In view of this experience, the question that poses itself is whether 
the AU should start from scratch or build on what has so far been 
achieved. It would seem that focusing on what has been achieved but 
relating it to the African context would be the most constructive way 
to proceed. Indeed, since Africa would not be “reinventing the wheel,” 
the process would be less protracted. This, in my view, would mean 
commissioning a small team of legal experts to look at the Guiding 
Principles in comparative reference to relevant AU instruments, such 
as the Charter and the Convention on Human and Peoples Rights 
of 1981, to ensure that the provisions of the Guiding Principles con-
form with the African normative outlook and meet the needs of the 
displaced on the continent. Their report would be presented to an 
enlarged team of representative experts from each of the five African 
sub-regions to consider and come out with an integrated text. An even 
broader forum involving pertinent stakeholders—including African 
civil society, NGOs, and external actors such as the relevant U.N. agen-
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cies—would then be organized to finalize the text before presentation 
to the member states of the AU for formal adoption.
Efforts are already underway to utilize the Guiding Principles in 
Africa’s sub-regions. The International Conference on the Great Lakes, 
for example, devised a legal framework under which the Guiding Prin-
ciples were adopted and are to be implemented.63 In terms of human 
resources, the project of developing a legal framework for the AU could 
be coordinated through the AU’s Division of Humanitarian Affairs, 
Refugees and Displaced Persons to assist with the operational manage-
ment of the project. A group of experts, who would be representative 
of Africa’s sub-regions, would be convened to discuss the text at its 
various stages, before formal submission to the appropriate AU body 
for adoption. Lastly, while this should be an African initiative, using 
African expertise and owned by Africans, it would be unwise not to 
utilize collaboration with non-African experts with experience on the 
international response to the global crisis of internal displacement.
VIII. Conclusion
Africa is home to more than half of the world’s internally displaced 
people. The most affected country in the world is Sudan, with nearly 
six million people displaced due to the prolonged war in the south 
and now the conflict in Darfur.64 Over the course of the last decade, 
the magnitude of the crisis of the displaced has grown more visible. 
The world’s displaced are forced to flee their homes because of inter-
nal armed conflicts, communal violence, and egregious violations of 
human rights. The internal displacement of people is a symptom of 
deep structural problems—the same troubles that generate conflict in 
the first place. Displacement calls for constructing societies in which 
all citizens are equal and their human rights and fundamental liberties 
are respected without discrimination on the grounds of race, national 
origin, ethnicity, religion, culture, gender, or other grounds. Internal 
displacement is thus a challenge of the state; indeed, it is a responsibil-
ity of the state.
As the U.N. Secretary-General’s Representative on IDPs, I approached 
sovereignty as a positive concept entailing responsibility for the protec-
tion and general welfare of the citizens and others falling under state 
jurisdiction. The Guiding Principles are premised on the notion of state 
responsibility and the complementary or supportive role of the inter-
national community. The Principles provide a normative framework 
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that can be utilized as a tool for shaping Africa’s response to displace-
ment.
Africa has its own contribution to make to an appropriate regional 
and international response by building on African cultural values and 
normative principles to reinforce a positive interpretation of sover-
eignty as responsibility. In advocating a mechanism for preventing/
resolving internal conflicts in Africa, Salim Ahmed Salim (then Secre-
tary-General of the Organization of African Unity) said that in African 
cultures and normative behaviors, “we are our brothers’ keepers,” a 
concept essentially akin to the responsibility to protect.65 We know that 
in Africa whenever there is a dispute in the family, including between 
the spouses, relatives and neighbors intervene on their own initiative 
to mediate. There is no notion of privacy or “internal affairs.” This 
is indeed an area in which Africa has much to offer the international 
community by fostering both the notion of sovereignty as responsibil-
ity and the responsibility of outsiders to assist when states fail to dis-
charge their national responsibility toward their needy citizens. •
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